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Abstract
This study investigates whether many people fear an unexpected
shock in their nancial situation around retirement and whether the
related expectations and realizations match each other. We use the
Dutch Social Economic Panel survey data, where expectations about
the next years nancial situation are reported. We show that realized
changes exceed expectations, and that this nding is more promi-
nent around age 65. The descriptive statistics, as well as the non-
parametric tests on the conditional distribution of expectations and
realizations, suggest that individuals around retirement are overly pes-
simistic and attach more weight to prospective bad events than to good
events. The model estimates show that their fears are unjustied, in
particular when individuals are highly educated. Further the link be-
tween macro shocks, micro-shocks and expectations is investigated.
Key Words: retirement, expectations, non parametric test.
JEL Codes: D84, J26
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1 Introduction
According to the life-cycle model in its stripped-down form, people should
dissave in the last phase of their life. This last phase begins at retirement,
when individuals have already experienced a relevant (and anticipated) drop
in income. If changes in income are fully anticipated, the stripped-down form
of the life-cycle model predicts that consumption remains constant since it is
always equal to individualsaverage anticipated life-time resources1Recent lit-
erature has shown that this model might fail to explain consumption behavior
according to age. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) nd that, around re-
tirement, consumption tracks the drop in income. In addition, they also nd
that the drop in consumption is larger than the drop in income. Their nd-
ings are based on a test for the validity of a Euler equation for consumption
on data from the British Family Expenditure Survey. Their forward-looking
model predicts the evolution of consumption correctly during middle life and
until about age 60. However, it fails to describe the post-retirement dip in
consumption observed in the data. This makes empirical evidence di¢ cult to
reconcile with mainstream theory. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) exam-
ine a range of possible explanations. They exclude the possibility that this dip
could be explained by liquidity constraints, since this should generate larger
pre-retirement savings, which is at odds with the empirical evidence. For
similar reasons, the authors also exclude the possibility of early retirement
(ER) as an unexpected event, and that the solution of income uncertainty at
retirement (associated with diminished current consumption) may cause the
dip. They speculate that the occurrence of unexpected adverse information
0I thank Rob Alessie, Bas van der Klaauw and Maarten Lindeboom for commenting on
previous versions of this study. I also thank the participants into the European Society of
Population Economics annual meeting held at New York University from 13 to 15 of June
2003 and the participants into the conference on Improving Social Insurance Programs
held at Maryland University from 13 to 15 of September 2003.
Part of this research was carried out at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB).
0This paper is based on the Social Economic Panel (SEP) data administrated by Sta-
tistics Netherlands. The views expressed in this paper are of the author and do not
necessarily reect the views of Statistics Netherlands.
1That is, provided that there is no bequest; that individuals are rational; and that the
other usual assumptions are satised (no uncertainty, separability of preferences, etc.). In
general it is the marginal utility of consumption, and not consumption itself, that is to be
smoothed across time periods.
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could have negatively inuenced the consumption plans of consumers. Their
data do not allow a test of this implication, and they leave open the question
of whether the occurrence of unexpected shocks may have caused the dip in
consumption2.
This study starts from that point, and investigates whether many people
fear an unexpected shock in their nancial situation around retirement. We
show that, in general, realized changes exceed expectations, and that this
nding is more evident around age 65. This is done by using a household
panel containing subjective information on expectations about the respon-
dents present expectations of household nances and the realized changes
asked in the following year (see Section 2 below). The longitudinal nature of
the data allows for direct comparison between the ex-ante question on expec-
tations and the ex-post question on realizations. Sudden changes over time
to family composition and the occurrence of labor-market-related shocks are
also considered. In this way, we investigate the relationship between subjec-
tive expectations, realizations, and possibly unexpected events. The results
will also question the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis used in
most life-cycle models.
This analysis is relevant for a number of reasons. If the gap between
expectations and realizations tracks retirement for some specic group, this
could suggest new policies directed to a¤ect pre-retirement savings. It could
be interesting to identify what groups, if any, do not actually form ratio-
nal expectations around retirement. Access to better information about how
future retirees are treated may, for instance, inuence the expectations of
those who are currently still at work. In addition, since individuals are likely
to save more during their working life this could provide new motivation
to prolong elderly labor market participation. Further, since this study ex-
ploits Dutch data, the analysis will question the conventional wisdom that
in the Netherlands policies should be addressed to increasing pre-retirement-
savings. Supporters of this position use the argument that these increments
are necessary because older individuals experience drops in income that are
not foreseen, and therefore need to decumulate their wealth to nance con-
sumption.
A di¤erence between expectations and realizations is per se an indicator of
2Closely related to their study is that of Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002a). They
also nd that retirement a¤ects expectations negatively, as will be shown later on in this
study.
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inaccurate planning activity, or it is due to a shock that has not been foreseen.
It does not support the assumption of anticipative behavior that is at the
basis of the life-cycle model with expected utility. The comparison between
the individual subjective distribution of expectations and the distribution
of realizations will question, overall, the pertinence of the expected utility
framework with rational expectations 3. This is done in Appendix A following
the methodology of Das, Dominitz, and van Soest (1999) and Das and van
Soest (2001).
This study is not the rst to investigate these issues. Using data from a
new survey, Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002a) show that many working
households do expect a considerable fall in consumption when they retire.
Unfortunately, they only have a cross-section, and their respondents are only
selected among highly-educated academics. They divide the sample into two
groups: the currently-employed and the currently-retired. Those who are
already retired report signicantly smaller falls in consumption as compared
with those falls expected by respondents who are still in work. They show
that participation in the stock market plays a dominant role in explaining
the gap between expectations and outcomes, indicating that much of the
gap is a result of unexpected stock market appreciation. However, more
recently, Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) have also analyzed a similar cross-
section and report di¤erent results. They nd that the predictions expressed
by the future retirees do not di¤er from the realizations reported by the cur-
rent retirees. But, because of the nature of their data, they cannot control
for the future outcomes of those currently employed. While the studies of
Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002a) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) look
into expectations about consumption, this study looks at the other side of
the story, namely expectations (and outcomes) of the retirees nancial situa-
tion which, among other things, could indicate expected dissaving to nance
consumption around retirement. This study extends these studies by using a
panel data set, and, by accounting for individual e¤ects, tries to reconcile the
conicting evidence with standard theory. Our work generally supports the
conclusions of Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002a), however, our results also
support the view expressed by Hurd and Rohwedder (2003): that it is not the
unanticipated inadequacy of resources that surprises individuals. The results
3A simple denition of rational expectations is that the individual subjective distribu-
tion expressed in the (categorized) expectations coincides with the observed distribution
of the (categorized) realizations.
4
attribute the gap between expectations and realizations to the occurrence of
unexpected health-, family- or labor-market-related shocks and, especially,
to the intrinsically overly pessimistic attitude of respondents.
Recently, some literature has focussed on the relation between expec-
tations and realizations in retirement behavior. Gustman and Steinmeier
(2001) nd that individuals have a poor knowledge of their future pension
benet, even when they are about to retire. Individuals, who best know their
own nancial situation, can hardly state an expected pension benet close
to the one the authors compute using o¢ cial pension formulas4. Contrary to
the ndings in this study, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) do not nd any
systematic overestimation or underestimation of the underlying variable.
The study is organized as follows. Next, Section 2 describes the data
and concepts. Section 3 shows the descriptive analysis with the main nd-
ings. First, there is a dip in expectations at age 64 that is not supported
by realizations, second, there is a substantial distance between expectations
and realizations around ER age. Section 4 presents the econometric model.
Section 5 shows the results of the two models with two di¤erent dependent
variables: expectations, in the rst model; and the gap between expecta-
tions and realizations in the second. There the unjustied pessimism of
respondents, especially if highly-educated, will be underlined. Section 6 will
summarize the main results and conclusions. In addition, two Appendixes
are included (A and B). Appendix A will follow the methodology of Das,
Dominitz, and van Soest (1999), for the comparison of reported expectations
and realizations. They refer to income data, while here wealth is considered.
Their ndings are supported here. The results of the non-parametric tests
on predictions and realized changes (in that Appendix) suggest that individ-
uals do not form rational expectations (in the sense explained above) around
retirement. This means that their predictions are systematically inaccurate.
This could depend on macro-shocks (as will be tested later on), but it is plau-
sible to suspect that over the long period analyzed these will not point in
the same direction. Appendix B will clarify the construction of the nancial
incentive variables.
4If individuals include other potential sources of income to nance their retirement
into the expected retirement benet (that are not directly dependent on their labor market
performance), we think that some of the respondents predicting failures could be explained.
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2 Data and concepts
This study tries to test whether expectations around retirement deteriorate,
and whether their evolution is mirrored in reported realizations. This study
does not present consumption in the analysis (which is not observed in the
data), but looks directly at the expectations of the nancial situation as
the dependent variable, as well as the realizations of these expectations one
period ahead.
Expectations are observed in the Social Economic Panel Data (SEP). It is
administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), and contains approximately
5000 households per year. In structure and contents, this panel survey is
similar to the German Social Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the American
PSID. The aim of the SEP is to provide a description of the most important
elements of individual and household welfare, and to monitor changes in these
elements over time5.
The sample includes non-self-employed respondents aged 50 to 70 who
have been in the survey in the period 1987 to 1998 for at least 3 years6. The
sample consists of approximately 8000 observations. This amounts to 2623
individuals participating from 3 to 8 times into the survey. Two other samples
are used. The rst is the repeated cross-section with 17,093 observations in
the period 1990 to 1998, which is used for the income analysis7. The second is
the two-year (partially) rotating panel with about 10,000 observations. This
is used in the non-parametric tests in Appendix A8.
In the SEP, the questions eliciting subjective expectations and realiza-
tions refer both to individual income and to household nancial situation.
5This survey is not specically designed to cover retirement issues per se. The SEP
is representative of the Dutch population, but it excludes individuals living in special
institutions such as nursing homes. Statistics Netherlands applies a two-stage sampling
procedure. Firstly, municipalities are drawn with probability depending on the number of
inhabitants (big cities are drawn with certainty). Next, addresses are selected randomly.
All households present at the selected address are interviewed, up to a maximum of 3
households. Over the years 1984 to 1989, households were interviewed twice a year. Since
1990 the survey has been held annually.
6The self-employed are dropped because of the impossibility to compute their future
pension benets. The 3-year panel is necessary because of the lag of the income questions,
which refer to earnings in the previous year.
7Income is registered in the SEP di¤erently across the 1980s and the 1990s, and there-
fore the income analysis only includes the waves available for the 1990s.
8The tests are based on the comparisons between two periods only and do not need the
3-year panel.
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The answers to these questions are highly correlated9. Therefore, house-
hold nancial situationis used which is repeated in all waves of the panel.
Hence, the question about expectations is: How do you think the nan-
cial situation of your household will develop in the next 12 months?. It is
answered by choosing one of the ve ordered categories listed from 1 to 5:
signicantly worsen, somewhat worsen, remain the same, somewhat
improve, signicantly improve10. The question about realizations has the
same ve ordered categories as possible answers and is formulated as follows:
How did your nancial situation develop in the last 12 months?. The an-
swers to these two questions will be directly compared in Appendix A, in
order to question whether individuals form predictions that systematically
match realizations11.
The covariates that may have an inuence on these two subjective re-
sponses are: time e¤ects; taste shifters; retirement dummies; shocks; and
nancial indicators.
Time e¤ects will control for macro-shocks common to all individuals over
time. Taste shifters will include the usual exogenous regressors, like education
and family size.
Early retirement dummies will detect the exact timing of retirement. In
order to identify the potential early retirees, di¤erent denitions of (partial)
retirement are used. This is necessary since there is no clear cut denition
of ER in the survey. In any of these denitions retirement is identied by
a transition to the current state. This means that respondents who retire
in the year of observation (year t) are identied. Any denition used does
not explicitly refer to complete retirement. This is due to the registration in
the SEP of the labor participation status. This question refers to the main
activity of the respondent, and those answering that work is not their main
activitydo keep a residual participation on the labor market. As a rst
denition, the labor participation question is an excellent tool to identify
975% of the respondents report exactly the same answer to both questions while 22%
report an adjacent category (computations available on request). This indicates either
that individuals report the same concept while answering both questions, or that they
have di¢ culties in separating the two concepts.
10Dont knowanswers are accepted but not used in this analysis.
11The answers to questions concerning expectations are not easy to interpret. This
because individuals are asked to report point expectations. Previous literature has argued
that individuals will not necessarily make a prediction that corresponds to a mathematical
expectation. This is tested more extensively in Appendix A.
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(partial) retirement. Then, using the amount of weekly working hours allows
a second denition of partial retirement as the status of those individuals for
whom participation drops at least by 25% of the working schedule relative to
the panel observation in t 1. In addition a third income dependent denition
of partial retirement is used. Looking at income sources, an individual is
dened as retiring in panel wave t if he or she declares in t + 1 an income
for period t that is composed of 50% of retirement income, provided that
the individual was working in period t   1. A fourth denition will mark
the shift into old age pension (Algemene ouderdomswet - AOW). Unlike the
previous denitions, this is straightforward to identify, since individuals get
into such program when they turn 65.
A variable for labor market-related shocks is derived from a question
asked to those who stopped working within the last year. The question is:
Why did you stop working?. A range of 12 possible answers is given, and
in this study the ones that are used are: illness of the respondent; illness
of the partner or another family member; respondent was red; company
bankrupts. Changes in the family composition will also be included. It is
di¢ cult to asses how unanticipated these changes are.
Among the nancial indicators, we introduce the future income prole of
the individual (including both labor income and expected pension stream till
age 70). This is summarized in the present discounted value term. This
variable will be introduced in the estimation to test whether individuals ex-
pecting higher future earnings, or a more generous pension treatment, form
higher expectations over the next year. Appendix B provides some details
about the construction of this variable12. Finally, in the descriptive analy-
sis and in Appendix A wealth is used as a nancial indicator. The money
measure of nancial situation (that is the object of the subjective questions
quoted above) is derived from wealth data. It tries to approximate the con-
cept of liquid wealth. It sums up savings account, savings certicates,
bonds, mortgage bonds, stocks, options, other savings, money loans, current
account; and subtracts loan, credit, other loans, other debts, negative bal-
ance checking account. For more detailed information about wealth data in
12Indeed, some information relative for ER age and ER replacement rates is missing
from the SEP, but is essential for the computation of this variable. This issue will be
addressed using an auxiliary data set, the CERRA (Center for Research on Retirement
and Aging) that allows the imputation of the future age of eligibility for ER. This will be
implemented in the PDV formula that will include all life-cycle earnings of the individual,
as specied in Appendix B.
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the SEP, see Alessie and Kapteyn (2001).
3 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 shows that individuals between age 60 and 65 experience an income
drop, as the life-cycle model predicts.
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Figure 1: Male and Female total log-income by age and cohort, period 1990-1998.
Explanatory note: Log-income drop around (early) retirement age. This table is
based on repeated cross-sections in order to increase the dimension of the sample.
Observations = 17,093.
Source: SEP, own computations.
The gure plots di¤erent cohorts over time (the average year of birth is
given). For the two cohorts in which respondents are around ER age (60), an
income drop is observed. The vertical distance among the segments indicates
that younger cohorts have higher earnings when they reach a given age.
Following Table 1 liquid wealthreturns results that are consistent with
qualitative realizations13. This shows that this wealth measure is consistent
13Equality should give a result close to zero but here it is not the case. In addition we
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Table 1: Financial situation and realizations
Explanatory note: Respondents are selected when participating for 3 consecutive
years in the survey. Delta of liquid wealth between adjacent years are reported in
Dutch guilders (f). 1 euro = f 2.2. Base year 1990. Panel period 1984-1998.
Source: SEP, own computations.
with the subjective question about the realization of household nancial sit-
uation. Indeed individuals could also have di¤erent concepts in mind of what
is meant by nancial situation.
Figure 2 plots the main nding of this analysis: the evolution of expecta-
tions and realizations over age. The only evident drop in expectations occurs
at age 64, when individuals are about to qualify for the AOW (at age 65).
Around the age of ER, the distance between expectations and realizations
also increases.
The overall picture that we derive is that, in general, realizations are
better than expectations, and that this is denitely the case around the
entitlement to the AOW. Furthermore, expectations are generally always
below 3, i.e. the value indicating no change, and these are also declining
over age. This is not in line, at least in principle, with the already quoted
nding of Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) that estimating consumption
with a forward-looking model overestimate realized consumption. They point
indeed to an optimistic functioning of expectations. Our nding is, however,
cannot attach much signicance to the rst and the last category. It is worth noting that
the question asked in the SEP refers to the nancial situation of the household. Liquid
wealth is a relevant component of what the question refers to. The gures are reported in
Dutch guilders and refer to the wealth increments between two adjacent years.
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Figure 2: Expectations and realizations of household nances according to age.
Explanatory note: This gure is based on the 3-year panel. There are 8404 obser-
vations for the expectations in t-1, and 8039 for the realizations in t. Expectations
and realizations are increasingly ordered 1 to 5.
Source: SEP, own computations
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in line with Das, Dominitz, and van Soest (1999), and Ameriks, Caplin, and
Leahy (2002a)14.
Figure 3 plots expectations over the period 1987-1998. These seem to have
become more positive over time, though these remain in a small neighborhood
of variation. Interesting is the pattern around the economic slowdown in
1991-1993 . Increasing expectations follow the positive business cycle pattern
of the second half of the 1990s. Whether macro-shocks do play a role or not
in the analysis will be dealt with in the estimation. However, it is plausible to
suspect that, given the ten-year-long panel employed, macro-shocks should
not a¤ect expectations or realizations only in one direction.
Table 2 shows the distribution of expectations for di¤erent groups of re-
spondents. It shows that the population of non-retirees15 is less pessimistic
than those partially retiring or entering social security. The sum of those
expecting a decrease or a big decrease of their nances is about 21% for the
non-retirees, while it is from 13% to 20% larger for the retiring individu-
als. This indicates again that not only around age 65, but also around ER,
expectations are lower.
Table 3 shows the frequency of realizations in t, given expectations in t 1. If
individuals were fully rational predictors, we should observe the bold diagonal
of this table with gures close to 100%. It is indeed not the case. Accurate
forecasts are only done by individuals expecting no change in their nances
(largest group), while we see that improvements occur also for those who
did not expect it. The percentages show that individuals may be overly
pessimistic almost as much as too optimistic. Nevertheless, a vast majority
of respondents do expect a drop in their nances, while a minority expects an
increase. This means that the marginal distribution of the outcomes again
indicates the pessimism of the respondents.
In the remainder of the study, we will investigate in more detail the
evolution of expectations and the gap with realizations. Further analysis
is necessary to assess whether, ceteris paribus, there is a relation between
these two dependent variables and the covariates introduced in the previous
14In Appendix A, this result will be considered more in detail, by directly comparing
expectations and realizations. The distributions of the two variables will be compared.
This makes it possible to perform non-parametric tests that investigate which location
of the individual subjective distribution, if any, is reported when answering the question
about expectations.
15Those who are not retiring according to any retirement denition.
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Figure 3: Expectations and realizations over time.
Explanatory note: This gure is based on the 3-year panel. There are 8404 obser-
vations for the expectations in t-1, and 8039 for the realizations in t. Expectations
and realizations are increasingly ordered 1 to 5.
Source: SEP, own computations
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Table 2: Future expectations of household nances around retirement: dif-
ferent denitions
Explanatory note: The table is based on the 3-year panel. The total number of
observations is 8404. However, some individuals become retired according to more
than one denition. Therefore, the number of observations in this table is larger
than the total. Non-retirees are those individuals who do not qualify for any of
the four retirement denitions considered in the table.
Source: SEP, own computations.
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Table 3: Expectations and realizations at the individual level
Explanatory note: The table is based on the 3-year panel. The total number of
observations is 8404. Realizations have 365 missing values. The table compares
the matching, at the individual level, between expectations in t 1 and realizations
in t.
Source SEP: own computations.
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section.
4 Econometric model
In the models, yi;t denotes in turn the categorized answer to the question
about expectations and the di¤erence between expectations and realiza-
tions16. As in a standard ordered response model, the dependent variable
is related to the underlying latent variable yi;t in the following way:
yi;t = j if (mj 1 < yi;t  mj) j = 1; :::; 5: (1)
The boundaries  1 = m0 < m1 < ::: < m4 < m5 = 1 are constant
across individuals and will be estimated.
The underlying latent variable is modeled by the equation:
yi;t = 
0
0xi;t + t + ~i + ui;t i =1,...,N, t =1,...,T;
where xi;t is a vector of taste shifters reecting, for example, education,
gender and family composition. Time e¤ects t are included to allow for
macro-shocks, common to all respondents and not varying with xi;t. The
parameter ~i is an individual specic (random) e¤ect indicating unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals.
The white noise, which is the individual time-specic error term ui;t,
is normally distributed and independent of the regressors xi;t and of the
individual e¤ect ~i. The latter is treated as a random e¤ect. We allow for
an underlying correlation in Mundlak form. This means that the relation
between ~i and xi;t is specied as ~i = i + 
0
1xi. In xi only those variables
expected to be correlated with ~i are included.
16Expectations are ordered from 1 to 5, where 1 is very poor and 5 very good. The
dependent variable in the second model is expectations in t  1 minus realizations in t of
household nancial situation. The original 9 possible categories (from -4 to 4, including
zero) have been reduced to 5 by grouping the values -4,-3,-2 and 2,3,4. The variable is
then re-coded from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for expectations a lot lower than realizations ;
2 stands for expectations somewhat lower than realizations; 3 stands for expectations
equal to realizations ; 4 stands for expectations somewhat higher than realizations ;
and 5 stands for expectations a lot higher than realizations . This means that the higher
the dependent variable, the more unjustiably optimistic the respondent.
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5 Results
The results are shown in Table 4. Four models are described. The rst two
occupy the left panel of the table, and have expectations in t as the dependent
variable. In the left panel, the rst model (Model 1) does not include the
interactions between eligibility for mandatory retirement and education. The
second model (Model 2), does.
The last two models of Table 4 occupy the right panel of the table which
shows results for Model 3 and Model 4. In the right panel, the dependent
variable is the gap between expectations in t   1 and realizations in t and
Model 3 also does not include the interactions between eligibility for manda-
tory retirement and education.
5.1 Expectations model
This section describes the left panel of table 4, which comprises the rst four
columns of estimates and t-values. It refers to the model with categorized
expectations in t as the dependent variable. Evidently, for this table we had
to shift from the analysis of the expectations in t   1, carried out so far,
to expectations in t, since we can identify shocks only between years t   1
and t17. In addition, most comments on the model results will not specify
whether we refer to Model 1 and Model 2 in the left panel since these are
virtually identical, with the exception of the results concerning eligibility for
mandatory retirement.
The rst interesting result concerns the time e¤ects. Here the hypothesis
of absence of macro shocks is rejected. The time e¤ects are, jointly, signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero, with a 29;0:05 = 80:79 (far exceeding the critical
value of 16). The time coe¢ cients are neither always positive nor always neg-
ative. This means that, over time, macro e¤ects did not a¤ect expectations
in one direction only.
The coe¢ cients for the taste shifters are generally signicant. Males
report lower expectations than females. Highly-educated individuals have
higher expectations relative to elementary-educated respondents (who are the
17We want shocks to precede the reporting of expectations. However, the pattern of
this variable according to age is identical to the one in Figure 2. Some attrition is present
between waves t   1 and t. This accounts for the di¤erent amount of observations. We
return to expectations in t  1 in the remainder of Table 4.
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reference case). The educational dummies are assumed to be uncorrelated to
the individual e¤ect (for older individuals these are constant over time).
The coe¢ cients for the timing of individual retirement are all negative.
This was expected since the main ndings of the descriptive analysis had
shown dips in expectations associated to the time of ER and AOW. Of this
set of indicators, only those which capture the occurrence of the old age
pension are signicantly di¤erent from zero. This points to the notion that
around mandatory retirement, when an income drop is evident, individuals
have lower expectations about the future developments of their nancial situ-
ation. This reinforces the empirical ndings in Section 3, in the sense that it
establishes a systematic relation, ceteris paribus, between mandatory retire-
ment and the evolution of expectations. The model results also indicate what
groups, around retirement, become more pessimistic. Among the dummies
that identify mandatory retirement for the di¤erent education levels, the ref-
erence group is mandatory retirement for elementary education. The higher
education levels alone indicate a positive relation to expectations. This is no
longer the case when education interacts with the indicator for individuals
turning 65 (Model 2). Higher-educated respondents have lower expectations
when they become eligible for AOW. This is in line with the results of other
studies (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2002a).
The coe¢ cient associated with labor market shocks is, as expected,
negative and signicant. It indicates that those experiencing events such as
their employer becoming bankrupt, or a health shock that prevents them
from working, have lower expectations about the future. All the changes in
family composition and marital status that are listed do not turn out to be
signicant. For these kind of changes, it is more questionable to assume that
they were completely unexpected.
The rst di¤erence of the present discounted value of future earnings and
benets up to age 70 (over 105 guilders) is introduced among the nancial
indicators. A positive sign is expected. This because individuals with a
more generous pension treatment or with high expected future income, should
report more positive expectations. The coe¢ cient is signicant and indicates
that people expecting higher future earnings have, ceteris paribus, higher
expectations. This indicates that long-run implications a¤ect the short-run
prediction implied by the question concerning expectations. The variance
of the individual e¤ect is not signicant. However, endogenous individual
e¤ects arise when looking at some exogenous characteristics, such as family
size. This is a plausible result: the individual e¤ect picks up some time-
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Table 4: Multivariate analysis
Explanatory note: Expectations in the left panel are expressed in t, and in the
panel on the right in t-1 (and subtracted from realizations in t). Reference cases :
Year 1997, Elementary education.
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invariant characteristics such as attitude toward the future, that could well
be positively and signicantly correlated to larger family sizes. Including
(non-capital) income as a regressor did not improve the results: the relative
coe¢ cient was not signicant and is not present in this analysis.
5.2 Gap between expectations and realizations
The panel on the right of Table 4 reports the results for the model in which
the di¤erence between expectations in t   1 and realizations in t is the de-
pendent variable. It is organized like the panel with the expectations model
results. Including the present value (PDV) of future earnings resulted in a
coe¢ cient that was not signicant. We have estimated di¤erent specications
of the model, and in none the removal of this variable a¤ected the results
signicantly. Therefore we decided to present two specications that do not
include the PDV variable. Before describing the main results, it is necessary
to explain how the estimates should be interpreted. A positive sign is asso-
ciated with higher values of the dependent variable. When the dependent
variable increases this means that expectations exceed realizations: individ-
uals are overly optimistic. When the dependent variable is lower it means
that realizations exceed expectations: the respondent is overly pessimistic.
As in the left panel, again in Models 3 and 4 (which we describe to-
gether) time e¤ects are also generally signicant. Among the taste shifters,
households with smaller family size are more pessimistic than they should
be. None of the educational levels is signicant.
The introduction of the interaction between mandatory retirement and
the di¤erent education levels highlights the main nding of this study. When
estimating the model without these interactions, again the coe¢ cient relative
to age 65 conrmed a signicant overly pessimistic attitude of respondents
in general. The interaction with education allows the identication of which
groups are more inclined to underestimate the development of their nances.
When individuals turn 65, the coe¢ cients for intermediate education and
higher education are negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero. Hence
higher-educated respondents are overly pessimistic when they become eligible
for AOW. This means that they report lower expectations at age 64, but the
year after, when they are 65, they state a better than expected evolution
of their nancial situation. Again this nding is in line with the descriptive
analysis (see Figure 2), and with the ndings of Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy
(2002a). In this sense, we intend the rational expectations hypothesis as
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questionable, because we look at the capacity of individuals to anticipate
future events, and their systematic failure.
The dummies that identify changes of status are generally not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, with the exception of those experiencing widowhood or
divorce. This indicates that a failure to state expectations that will comply
with realizations does not depend only on labor-market-related shocks; nor
on the occurrence of unexpected changes concerning family size. This is
plausible since such shocks may well be anticipated (we cannot test for this).
The coe¢ cient associated with those becoming single (because of divorce
or widowhood) is signicant. This indicates that those experiencing such
an event had been too optimistic. In short, after divorce or widowhood,
individuals report realizations that are lower than the expectations reported
before the occurrence of such event, as may be expected. Again, family
size, as a time-invariant potentially endogenous covariate, is positive and
signicant. This indicates that those unobservables that make one choose to
have a larger family are also associated with overly optimistic responses.
A comparison of the two models reveals the following:
 Around ER and when individuals turn 65, i.e. when they expect an
income drop, their expectations deteriorate. Their fears are unjustied
in the sense that they do not come true. The year after, the realizations
of the individual nancial situation are better than expected. This is
particularly evident for higher-educated individuals becoming eligible
for the AOW
 Changes of status, such as stopping work or becoming sick do play a
signicant role in the evolution of expectations. On the other hand be-
coming single is signicantly correlated with the gap with realizations.
Their actual e¤ect is consistent with their a priori expected e¤ect.
5.3 Decomposition
Given the above analysis, we feel condent in using the estimation results
of the models to perform some simulations. The aim is to decompose the
observed drop in expectations of individuals eligible for old age pension as
determined by two di¤erent e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is determined by all in-
dividual characteristics, the second exclusively by eligibility for mandatory
retirement (e). In order to identify these two e¤ects, an Oaxaca decomposi-
tion is computed.
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In order to isolate the e¤ect of eligibility, which enters the model with
some indicators (de), the following steps are followed. First, the estimates in
the left panel of Table 4 are used to predict the mean value of expectations
(y) for those who are not eligible (E(ye=0jde = 0)), separately from those
who are eligible (E(ye=1jde = 1)) . For this second group, which is aged 64
in t  1, a second prediction is computed, i.e. the same way as the previous
one, but dropping the eligibility indicator (E(ye=1jde = 0)).
In this way, the overall e¤ect E(ye=0jde = 0)  E(ye=1jde = 1) is decom-
posed into two e¤ects:
[E(ye=0jde = 0)  E(ye=1jde = 0)]| {z }
characteristics
  [E(ye=1jde = 1)  E(ye=1jde = 0)]| {z }
eligibility
(2)
where the second term of 2 identies the e¤ect of the eligibility indicators on
average expectations, since these are the only parameters that di¤er between
the two predicted values.
In the observed data, expectations drop at age 64 from approximately
2.83 to 2.63. The result of the decomposition indicates that individual char-
acteristics account for an average drop of 0.10, while eligibility indicators
account for the remaining drop of 0.9. This means that 46% of the drop in
expectations is attributable to an eligibility e¤ect, while the remaining 54%
may be attributed to all other remaining characteristics.
6 Summary and Conclusions
A drop in expectations about the future nancial situation is observed at
age 64. Such an expected drop is in line with the standard life-cycle model
hypothesis that predicts decumulation of wealth after retirement, but is not
mirrored in the observed outcomes. Even after controlling for observable
characteristics and for the residual lifetime resources available to individuals,
the drop is still evident. This shows that individuals become overly pes-
simistic at the age of eligibility for old age pension. Furthermore, around the
early retirement age, the gap between expectations and realizations increases.
This study exploits the Social Economic Panel data to investigate whether
individuals fear a shock in their nances around retirement and whether their
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fears are justied. Tracking individuals over time allows a direct comparison
to be made between expectations about the next year and the realizations of
the year after, following the methodology of Das, Dominitz, and van Soest
(1999). Rational individuals, loosely speaking, should be able to predict with
accuracy their future, if macro- or micro-shocks do not disturb their environ-
ment. This is directly tested in this study. Thanks to the panel nature of
the data, several denitions of micro-shocks are introduced. This is a rarely
used approach for studies on the evolution of short-run expectations around
retirement18. Also several denitions of early retirement are introduced in
order to detect the exact timing of individual early retirement. Two types
of random e¤ect panel data models are estimated, both for expectations and
for the gap with realizations.
The empirical results can be summarized as follows:
 The covariates introduced produce, in general, plausible estimation re-
sults.
 Individuals do fear a shock in their nancial situation, but their fears
are, in general, unjustied. Such fears are mainly evident for-higher
educated respondents
 Macro-shocks are a signicant determinant of expectations, but, over
the 10-year period of this analysis, they go in di¤erent directions.
 micro-shocks are also a signicant component that explains part of the
gap between expectations and realizations.
 The generosity of the pension system in the long run has a direct e¤ect
on the evolution of expectations.
 Decomposing the e¤ect of all covariates on expectations attributes to
eligibility for old age pension a large e¤ect in determining the expecta-
tions drop at age 64.
This means that individuals, around (mandatory) retirement age, are
overly pessimistic and attach more weight to prospective bad events than to
good events. This questions the adoption of the expected utility framework
18Disney and Tanner (1999) introduce micro-shocks in their analysis, but they investi-
gate expected retirement age. Using only two waves, they cannot test for the systematic
relation between these shocks, expectations, and realizations, for all individuals.
23
with rational expectations employed in the estimation of the (post-retirement
part of the) life-cycle model. The results of this study are in line with several
studies that make use of directly reported expectations and realizations. In
particular the ndings of Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002a), are conrmed
here and reinforced by the use of the panel, the inclusion of an individual
e¤ect, the inclusion of di¤erent denitions of retirement status, and micro-
shocks. The idea that individuals are surprised by the inadequacy of re-
sources, and therefore need to decumulate their wealth, does not nd direct
support in this study. It seems plausible to conclude that it is eligibility per
se that drives the drop in expectations and, therefore, the mismatch with
realizations.
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Appendices
A Expected versus realized wealth changes
According to Das and van Soest (2001) if individuals are perfectly rational,
they should report a location of their individual subjective distribution that
coincides with the one relative to the distribution of the realization. As in
Table 3, some insight could be gained by comparing predictions with self-
reported outcomes. But such comparison is not straightforward, since there
is no reason to expect that the distribution of expectations across the pop-
ulation is the same as the distribution of the actual variable. Even when
realizations and predictions coincide, the two variable are not comparable.
While the outcome is based on the distribution of the actual variable, expec-
tations reect some location of the individual subjective distribution (mode,
mean, etc...). One could try to study such locations by considering di¤erent
models which generate the best predictions of the prospective realizations.
One could think of respondents minimizing a loss function. Respondents
could, for instance, refer to the modal category or to some quantile of the
subjective distribution. In the rst case, when confronted with the ve or-
dered categories of the question, respondents could report the mode of their
subjective distribution. In the second they could instead report the median.
The data contain questions eliciting expectations of outcome y = nancial
situation; where respondents may choose among ordered categories. Let
f(yjs) be the subjective probability density of outcome y, given information
s. Respondents choose one of the K categories C1; :::; CK of the form Ck =
(mk 1;mk]; with  1 = m0 < m1 < ::: < mk 1 < mK = 1: The threshold
values mk are subjectively determined, and ordered models may be used to
estimate their values. The answer to the expectation question is denoted by
p. The minimization of some loss function will return p (see formula 3). If
the respondents answer the question having in mind the most likely outcome,
they will report the mode of their subjective distribution. This means that
they report the category p = argmaxk P fy 2 Ckjsg. This corresponds to
minimizing, with respect to k, the expected loss function: E f1 (y =2 Ck) jsg.
Here the behavior of an individual forming some point expectations p , and
choosing the category p that contains p, is treated. The general form of
the problem is minimizing the expected loss for some loss function L:
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p = argmin

Z 1
 1
L (y   ) f(yjs)dy
p = k i¤ p 2 Ck: (3)
If respondents interpret the question as eliciting the median of f (yjs), the
relative loss function will be L(u) = juj, while for the category containing
the mean the loss function will be L(u) = u2:
If individual expectations are rational, the categorized answer to the ques-
tion about expectations and to the question about realizations should mirror
a location from the same distribution. This location could be, for instance,
the mode, the median, or the mean of such individual distribution. By com-
paring expectations and outcomes, the following tests are performed to show
that what individuals report is not one of those locations, and this questions
the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis.
A.0.1 Modal category
Following Das and van Soest (1997), we formalize the modal category as-
sumption for individual i, given the available information xi, as:
P fci = kjxi; pi = kg  P fci = jjxi; pi = kg , j = 1; :::; K; (4)
where ci is the realized category and k is the predicted category. For those
individuals with pi = k, most outcomes will be located in category k. Real-
izations, in the best-case scenario, are based upon drawings from the same
distribution leading to probabilities 4. We can use observations of ci to
see whether expression 4 holds. Dene for notational convenience Pj 
P fci = jjxi; pi = kg : Let P^j be the sample equivalent of Pj19. Under the
hypothesis of the independence of realizations, frequencies of nancial situ-
ation can be used to estimate the probabilities in 4. Assuming xi = year of
observation Table 3A1 reports the frequencies. Table 3A1 shows that only
for the case k = 3 could the modal category assumption be used as a model
generating expectations. For k = 1, for instance, this is only true in years
1995-1996 and 1996-1997. Globally only 14 cases out of 40 behave according
to the modal category assumption,which suggests its irrelevance20.
19That is the number of observations with c = j and pi = k and the given value of xi.
20We have also estimated Table 3A1 conditional on several covariates of xi, such as
gender and education. The results are conrmed.
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A.0.2 Median Category
If the survey responses correspond to a category that contains a point predic-
tion that minimizes a loss function, it is natural to interpret pi as containing
the -quantile of the respondents subjective distribution of yi. For  = 0:5,
the category is the one containing the median. If pi is the -quantile (corre-
sponding, for convenience, to the cumulative probability ) then in the best
case scenario it must be:
P fyi   pi  0jxig = :
Since we observe the category ci , we focus on the case with ci = k. Then:
P fci  k   1j si; pi = kg <   P fci  kj si; pi = kg
that implies the following inequalities:
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Table 3A1: Estimates of P fci = cjpi = kg
c=1 c=2 c=3 c=4 c=5 Obs
k=1 90 - 91 18% 24% 47% 6% 6% 17
strong 91 - 92 32% 23% 42% 3% 0% 31
decrease 92 - 93 32% 19% 35% 13% 0% 31
93 - 94 27% 34% 32% 7% 0% 44
94 - 95 35% 13% 39% 11% 2% 84
95 - 96 40% 28% 28% 2% 2% 53
96 - 97 40% 27% 22% 11% 0% 73
97 - 98 35% 20% 37% 0% 8% 65
k=2 90 - 91 16% 33% 48% 3% 0% 132
decrease 91 - 92 12% 35% 46% 7% 1% 183
92 - 93 8% 32% 49% 9% 2% 180
93 - 94 5% 43% 42% 7% 2% 204
94 - 95 10% 32% 47% 9% 2% 363
95 - 96 10% 33% 48% 7% 1% 279
96 - 97 8% 32% 50% 9% 1% 312
97 - 98 8% 24% 51% 16% 1% 228
k=3 90 - 91 3% 12% 70% 13% 2% 667
no 91 - 92 3% 16% 66% 13% 2% 581
change 92 - 93 3% 19% 66% 10% 1% 616
93 - 94 4% 18% 66% 10% 1% 607
94 - 95 3% 14% 70% 12% 1% 1031
95 - 96 5% 18% 67% 9% 1% 1172
96 - 97 3% 14% 67% 14% 2% 1098
97 - 98 3% 12% 65% 18% 2% 1145
k=4 90 - 91 2% 7% 54% 28% 8% 95
increase 91 - 92 5% 15% 46% 24% 10% 100
92 - 93 0% 6% 44% 41% 9% 94
93 - 94 7% 7% 55% 26% 5% 76
94 - 95 3% 27% 38% 23% 9% 115
95 - 96 3% 10% 41% 40% 6% 144
96 - 97 5% 5% 48% 33% 10% 147
97 - 98 1% 10% 36% 50% 3% 176
k=5 90 - 91 0% 0% 60% 20% 20% 5
strong 91 - 92 0% 14% 43% 0% 43% 7
increase 92 - 93 0% 0% 38% 50% 13% 8
93 - 94 0% 0% 33% 33% 33% 3
94 - 95 13% 13% 33% 13% 27% 15
95 - 96 11% 6% 50% 33% 0% 18
96 - 97 0% 12% 18% 59% 12% 17
97 - 98 0% 0% 42% 17% 42% 12
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Explanatory note: k=predicted category; c=realized category. Respondents are
selected when participating for two consecutive years in the survey.
Source SEP: own computations.
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P fci > kj xi; pi = kg  1   (5)
P fci < kj xi; pi = kg < : (6)
To t in the best-case scenario the, -quantile of ci must fall in category k,
given that pi = k; with no more than 100% of realized values in the lower
categories, and no more than 100(1  )% in higher categories. A test for
5 and 6 is reported in Table 3A2 using the data of table 3A1 and is based
upon:
p
n
 
KX
j=k+1
P^j  
KX
j=k+1
Pj
!
{ !N
 
0;
 
1 
KX
j=k+1
Pj
!

KX
j=k+1
Pj
!
,
where n is the number of observations, and xi is only composed by year
of observation. In the table, the value of  = 0:5 should be included in
the condence intervals in order to conclude that individuals are reporting a
median as a point expectation.
This test uses the ordering of the categories. This suggests that the
assumptions required for the modal category case were less stringent. For
the case of  = 0:5, we see that 5 and 6 for all k do not imply that 4 holds
for all k and j, and vice versa. It is true though that, for the extreme values
of the k categories, the inequalities 5 and 6 will hold21. Such a test imposes
the condition that an absolute majority should fall into a certain category,
rather than a relative majority as in the modal case. In this sense, the median
category assumption is more restrictive and it does not come as a surprise
that the results are poor in terms of predictive capacity.
A.0.3 Mean category
When the loss function is L(u) = u2, then pi reects the category containing
the mean. To test this implication, we need the rich data that, in the SEP,
approximate the concept of yi, rather than the ordered category ci. We use
21Namely, for k = 1; i.e. the rst category, (5) implies (4) ; while for the last category
k = K = 5; (6) implies (4) :
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liquid wealth as a proxy for household nancial condition, as mentioned in
the question eliciting ci (see Section 3.2).
In this case, the answer pi is the category containing E fyijxig. When
pi = k, then p will fall within two adjacent thresholds (mk 1 and mk1).
That is:
E fyijxi; pi = kg 2 (mk 1;i;mk;i]:
Given the presence of outliers in the distribution of wealth changes the
rst and the last 5% percentile were omitted in the computation of Table
3A3.
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Table 3A2: 90% condence intervals
P fci < kj xi; pi = kg P fci > kj xi; pi = kg
lower upper lower upper Obs
k=1 90 - 91 - - 0.67 0.98 17
strong 91 - 92 - - 0.54 0.82 31
decrease 92 - 93 - - 0.54 0.82 31
93 - 94 - - 0.62 0.84 44
94 - 95 - - 0.57 0.74 84
95 - 96 - - 0.49 0.71 53
96 - 97 - - 0.5 0.70 73
97 - 98 - - 0.55 0.74 65
k=2 90 - 91 0.11 0.21 0.44 0.59 132
decrease 91 - 92 0.08 0.16 0.47 0.59 183
92 - 93 0.04 0.11 0.54 0.66 180
93 - 94 0.03 0.08 0.46 0.57 204
94 - 95 0.07 0.12 0.54 0.63 363
95 - 96 0.07 0.13 0.51 0.61 279
96 - 97 0.05 0.11 0.55 0.64 312
97 - 98 0.05 0.11 0.63 0.73 228
k=3 90 - 91 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.17 667
no change 91 - 92 0.17 0.22 0.12 0.17 581
92 - 93 0.19 0.25 0.09 0.14 616
93 - 94 0.19 0.25 0.10 0.14 607
94 - 95 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.14 1031
95 - 96 0.21 0.25 0.09 0.12 1172
96 - 97 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.18 1098
97 - 98 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.22 1145
k=4 90 - 91 0.55 0.71 0.04 0.13 95
increase 91 - 92 0.58 0.74 0.05 0.15 100
92 - 93 0.42 0.58 0.04 0.13 94
93 - 94 0.60 0.77 0.01 0.09 76
94 - 95 0.62 0.76 0.04 0.13 115
95 - 96 0.47 0.61 0.02 0.09 144
96 - 97 0.51 0.65 0.06 0.14 147
97 - 98 0.41 0.53 0.01 0.05 176
k=5 90 - 91 0.51 1 - - 5
strong 91 - 92 0.26 0.88 - - 7
increase 92 - 93 0.68 1 - - 8
93 - 94 0.22 1 - - 3
94 - 95 0.55 0.92 - - 15
95 - 96 1 1 - - 18
96 - 97 0.75 1 - - 17
97 - 98 0.35 0.82 - - 12
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Explanatory note: Predicted category = k. c=realized category; x= year.
Source: SEP, own computations
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In addition, in this case, xi is dened by gender to keep the amount of
observations higher in any cell.
In Table 3A3 standard deviation increases with k in the case of females,
but not the sample means, as we would expect. For males instead the sample
means are conveniently ordered. This table also produces mixed results. This
could depend on the denition of y that we adopt.
Overall, none of the three hypotheses tested produced conclusive results,
probably indicating that individual may actually be minimizing asymmetric
loss functions that attach more weight to lower expectations categories. More
simply, the individual distribution of expectations and realization do not co-
incide, as the rational expectations hypothesis would suggest. Das (1998),
who has similar results, using income data, is able to test this implication
directly. He nds that asymmetric results are plausible and that individual
attach more weight to perspective worse events. The erratic nature of ob-
served wealth changes makes this test unfeasible in our case, since it is again
based on the (cumulative) distribution of yi = liquid wealth.
Table 3A3: Wealth changes per expectation category
k liquid wealth (standard deviations) Obs
male 1 -1884.551 ( 41247.86 ) 312
2 -929.1975 ( 31921.63 ) 930
3 1430.206 ( 40940.27 ) 3557
4 4620.814 ( 42084.57 ) 852
5 24031.61 ( 88995.39 ) 160
female 1 123.2286 ( 26948.55 ) 321
2 -510.8509 ( 27234.47 ) 986
3 1366.885 ( 38709.88 ) 3538
4 4521.063 ( 44765.27 ) 692
5 20587.99 ( 92683.27 ) 101
Explanatory note: Respondents are selected when participating for three consec-
utive years in the survey. Predicted category = k. k=1 is a big decrease; k=2 is
a decrease; k=3 is equal; k=4 is an increase; k=5 is a big increase.
Source: SEP, own computations
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B Imputation of PDV variable
The present discounted value of future incomes and benets is included as an
explanatory variable in the ordered probit model described in Section 4. This
variable is derived under several assumptions concerning both the behavior
of individuals towards the pension system and the ev5olution of their income
prole till age 69.
B.1 Opting out at Early Retirement
Previous research demonstrates that the institutional and nancial incentives
related to ER are so favorable in the Netherlands that the vast majority
of individuals who are eligible for ER do actually opt out as soon as they
become eligible (see, e.g., Lindeboom (1999)). Unfortunately, in the SEP,
the ER entitlement age is not observed. That is why we use an auxiliary
data set, the CERRA, to estimate the probability distribution of eligibility.
A logit model and an ordered logit model are estimated for the availabil-
ity of an ER scheme and the age of eligibility given entitlement, respectively
(see Table 3B1). As explanatory variables, we include some individual back-
ground variables, a dummy variable for public sector and experience. The
choice of the RHS variables is motivated by convenience and based on the
consideration of the most common entitlement rules to ER schemes. Next,
the parametersestimates are used to compute the probability distribution
of the expected ER age for individuals in the SEP. This distribution is used
to compute part of the present discounted value of those who work up to the
age of ER eligibility, that (early) retire at that age, and eventually receive
ER benet till age 64 and old age pension plus occupational pension from
age 65 to 69. Hence, knowing the probability of retirement at a certain age
identies the (fraction of) the future income that will be used for the com-
putation of the occupational pension after age 6522. We report the model
results for eligibility in Table 3B1 23.
22Another option could be to predict only labor earnings. This, however, would be
problematic for those who have already partially entered an ER scheme and have a low
labor income and a positive pension income.
23Eligibilityis derived from the answer to the question : Does the company you work
for now have an ER scheme?. Eligibility ageis derived from the question: What is the
minimum age to enter the ER scheme o¤ered by your company? 
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Table 3B1 . Eligibility Model
Eligibility Eligibility Age
Age 0.060 0.031
(2.26)** (1.61)*
Experience -0.060 0.005
(8.28)*** (0.90)
Married 0.158 -0.113
(0.33) (0.44)
Divorced -0.071 -0.080
(0.13) (0.25)
Single 0.660 -0.195
(1.06) (0.46)
Sector 2.271
(17.02)***
Constant -3.527
(2.31)**
Observations 987 1240
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09
Log likelihood -502.80 -1742.44
Explanatory note: The reference case for marital status is widow; for
sector, it is private sector. T-values within brackets.
Source: CERRA, own computations.
B.1.1 Income proles
Income proles are generated according to the following auto-regressive xed-
e¤ect panel data model24. The within-estimator for the xed e¤ect model is
derived from
yit = + xit + i + "it i = 1; :::; N ; t = 1; :::; Ti;
where "it = "i;t 1+it, and jj<1 and it is iid with zero mean and variance
2n, while i are xed parameters that can be correlated to xit if those vary
over time.
24The model is specied only for predictions, and is not meant to be an income model
with causality relations.
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Table 3B2 contains the results of the xed-e¤ect model for total earnings
in t and t  125.
Table 3B2. Non-Capital Income Model.
Total Income in t Total Income in t-1
Non-capital income in t -0.045
-(2.96)***
Age in t 1,599.866
(4.83)***
Age square in t 6.050
(1.60)
Non-capital income in t-1 -0.094
-(6.39)***
Age in t-1 -684.795
(2.71)***
Age square in t-1 30.826
(8.36)***
Constant -67,311.886 -17,536.867
-(8.97)*** -(5.01)***
Observations 4836 5202
Number of groups 1341 1420
Log likelihood -53757.26 -57789.98
Ro AR 0.16 0.31
Explanatory note: t-values within brackets.
Source: SEP, own computations.
B.2 Implementation of ER age in the present discounted
value
As stated above, in the SEP, we do not observe the eligibility age of ER
schemes in the private sector but the probability distribution of it. We may
observe an individual working at age 57. For this individual, we have imputed
a probability distribution for e (year of eligibility) in the SEP. This associates
25This is done to allow the computation, for each panel wave, of the rst di¤erence of
the PDV which is used in the estimation.
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a probability of becoming eligible to any age between 55 and 64. We will
treat this individual as if he were not eligible at age 55 and 56. So the
probability of becoming eligible at age 57 will be conditioned on the sum
of the probabilities at age 55 and 56. In the remainder of this Appendix,
we will show how to integrate out of the pension formula the unknown ER
eligibility age using its distribution. Dene the random variable et as the
year in which someone becomes eligible to ER, y as non-capital income, and
l as labor participation.
The present discountedvalue (PDV) of continued work will result from the
sum of the PDV of non-capital income till age 64 (yt), as derived in Table
3B2, plus the PDV of pension (P ). This last item, the pension benet from
age 65 on, is the sum of old age pension (AOW ) plus occupational pension.
Eligibility probabilities only matter for the computation of the occupational
pension (that depends on experience (ten), last salary (w), and the franchise
(fra)). This means that, for any individual, the following will hold:
PDV (yt + P jl0 = 1) =
RX
t=
yt+
TX
t=R
AOW+Pr (et<tjet > )[min (40; ten+ t  )  1; 75%  (wt   fra)]
where R =year when old age pension begins,  is the current period. Evi-
dently both the franchise and the AOW are kept to the current level and the
discount rate is 1 (does not appear in the formula).
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